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Note
1000 Days Late1 & $1 Million Short2: The Rise and
Rise of Intrastate Equity Crowdfunding
Timothy M. Joyce*
INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Jumpstart Our Business Startups
Act (the JOBS Act)3 in 2012 in order to open domestic capital
markets to small businesses.4 In the wake of the 2007 global
market recession, bank lending to small businesses slowed
dramatically.5 The problems traditionally associated with
obtaining funding for small businessesinformational
inefficiency and unavailability of funds in smaller amounts, for
examplewere compounded by a risk-averse financial sector.6
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1. A reference to the delay of more than three years between when the
JOBS Act mandated SEC rulemaking for federal crowdfunding (Summer
2012) and when the SEC published its Final Rules (Autumn 2015). The delay
is discussed more fully in Parts I.B & I.D, infra.
2. A reference to the difference between the federal yearly crowdfund
raising limit ($1 million) and that of several state models (e.g., Minnesota, $2
million). The differences between the federal and Minnesota crowdfunding
rules are discussed more fully in Part II, infra.
3. Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) [hereinafter The JOBS Act].
4. WILLIAM MICHAEL CUNNINGHAM, THE JOBS ACT: CROWDFUNDING
FOR SMALL BUSINESSES AND STARTUPS 27 (2012).
5. See id., at 21 (When banks are told to reduce risk, small businesses,
especially startups, are the first to see credit levels reduced.) (commenting
generally on the effect of new federal banking regulations on the small
business sector).
6. See C. Steven Bradford, Crowdfunding and the Federal Securities
Laws, 2012 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 1, 10104 (2012) (explaining informational
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To unlock the untapped power of small businesses to spur job
growth,7 Congress borrowed an innovation from the social
media age: crowdfunding.8 Title III of the JOBS Act seek[s] to
model [equity securities offerings after] popular websites like
Kickstarter and IndieGoGo by providing an online
marketplace for entrepreneurs to solicit investment from the
general public via equity crowdfunding.9 By opening up
securities investment to the crowd without the need for
expensive registration and ongoing compliance filings by
issuers, the Act was an attempt to close the capital funding gap
faced by small businesses.10
However, the Acts crowdfunding regulations have not been
welcomed as the cure-all some predicted, especially as the rise
of intrastate options have provided investors with state-level
crowdfunding alternatives.11 While the delay for federal Final
Rules for Regulation Crowdfunding,12 and the conflicts between
revisions to Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule
inefficiency, and outlining the historical funding gap for companies with
limited operations history or only a small fundraising need).
7. See CUNNINGHAM, supra note 4, at 24 (What is unquestioned is that
small companies are responsible for most of the new jobs created in the U.S.
economy.).
8. See id., at 6 (At its best, the law recognizes that changes in
technology have necessitated a revision to securities laws.).
9. Peter J. Loughran et al., The SEC Hands Out a Halloween Treat to
Crowdfunding Supporters, ABA BUS. L. TODAY (Dec. 2015), http://www
.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2015/12/06_loughran.html.
10. See Bradford, supra note 6, 99100 (Very small businesses,
particularly startups, have an unmet need for capital that securities
crowdfunding would help to meet.).
11. Christopher Douglas Mitchell, Charting a New Revolution in Equity
Crowdfunding: The Rise of State Crowdfunding Regimes in Response to the
Inadequacy of Title III of the JOBS Act, 3 J. MARSHALL GLOBAL MKT. L.J.,
135, 135 (2015) (While the federal crowdfunding provisions in the [JOBS Act]
have received much publicity, states are taking a leading role in enacting
equity crowdfunding laws. State-enacted intrastate crowdfunding laws
authorize securities offerings by residents of a single state . . . . Securities
offerors who meet a states intrastate crowdfunding exemption can engage in a
securities offering without registering the offering with the federal or
applicable state government.).
12. See Kevin LaCroix, Guest Post: Some States Have Sidestepped the
JOBS Acts Burdensome Crowdfunding Rules, THE D&O DIARY (May 15,
2014), http://www.dandodiary.com/2014/05/articles/securities-litigation/some-
states-have-sidestepped-the-jobs-acts-burdensome-crowdfunding-rules/
(describing how the SECs delayed enactment of the JOBS Act affected
crowdfunding).
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147 and intrastate models13 mean that there is not yet a perfect
option, there are reasons why investors might still opt for
crowdfunding in general over other fundraising options. To the
extent that a client is interested in the marketing appeal of
crowdfunding and able to meet its funding goals within the
yearly limits of either the state or federal option, this Note will
provide useful guidance as to which crowdfunding program
might be most appealing. The Note will first defend a
commonsense approach for how to deal with the Rule 147
amendment proposal.14 In the end, this Note concludes that use
of crowdfunding models can ultimately make some sense,
especially as investors cautiously tiptoe out of the recession.
Part I of this Note will trace the history of equity
crowdfunding, beginning with an examination of the general
features and practices of crowdfunding and how they implicate
federal and state securities laws. Part I then introduces Title
III of the JOBS Act and the SECs subsequent attempt at the
mandated rulemaking. Part I further describes the reaction by
many state legislatures to major delays in the SECs
rulemaking process, and to doubts about the desirability of the
SECs 2013 proposed rules. Part I concludes by framing the
situation today, where small businesses have choices between a
new, restrictive federal option and state options impacted by
13. See, e.g., Letter from Anthony Zeoli, Partner, Freeborn & Peters LLP,
to Brent Fields, Secy, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Commn, (Nov. 5, 2015) (Re: File
Number S7-22-15) [hereinafter Zeoli Letter] (describing the conflicts between
proposed SEC Rule 147 revisions and intrastate models as well as possible
solutions).
14. Editors Note: This Note was substantively drafted and selected for
publication in early 2016, during the notice and comment period for the SECs
proposed Rule 147 amendments. In fact, the SEC adopted final rules in
October 2016 (published in the Federal Register in November 2016) that
substantially conform to several parts of the approaches analyzed and
advocated in Part II.B, infra. See Exemptions To Facilitate Intrastate and
Regional Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 33-10238, Exchange
Act Release No. 34-79161, 81 Fed. Reg. 83,494 (Nov. 21, 2016) (to be codified
in scattered sections of 17 C.F.R.) [hereinafter Final Rule 147/147A Rules]
(adopting changes to modernize Rule 147s application in the internet age
while remaining a safe harbor under Securities Act Section 3(a)(11), and
creating a new standalone exemption in Rule 147A); Press Release, Sec. &
Exch. Commn, SEC Adopts Final Rules to Facilitate Intrastate and Regional
Securities Offerings (Oct. 26, 2016), https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease
/2016-226.html (SEC Release 2016-226). Even though the final rules adopt a
combination of the approaches analyzed below, the subsequent comparative
analysis of state vs. federal models remains relevant.
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potential15 Rule 147 revisions for their securities crowdfunding
offerings. Part II delves deeper into the mechanics of the
competing crowdfunding models, comparing the federal final
rules against one states (Minnesotas) attempt at a state-level
crowdfunding exemption. Part III ultimately concludes with a
suggestion that companies with smaller capital requirements
and local customer base might prefer the comparatively less
onerous state models, while companies requiring larger capital
outlays or lacking local name recognition may prefer the
federal crowdfunding model.
I. BACKGROUND
A. TRADITIONAL SECURITIES LAW ROADBLOCKS TO THE RISE OF
EQUITY CROWDFUNDING
Crowdfunding is the use of the Internet to raise money
through small contributions from a large number of
investors.16 The collective wisdom of the crowd . . . allow[s]
investors to identify and reward good ideas.17 By its very
name, crowdfunding implies that there must be a large group
of potential investors from which to draw funding.18 Prior to
the JOBS Act, federal securities law prohibited general
solicitation and advertising (including by internet) of most
securities offerings, thus preventing entrepreneurs from full
access to the crowd.19 However,
[w]hen it passed the JOBS Act of 2012, Congress ordered the SEC to
eliminate this prohibition on general solicitation and advertising in
two instances. Title II of the JOBS Act ordered the SEC to allow
15. See Editors Note supra note 14, regarding the final status of the Rule
147 amendments.
16. See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 6, at 1.
17. See Jamie Hopkins & Katie Hopkins, Not All that Glitters is Gold 
Limitations of Equity Crowdfunding Regulations, 16 DUQ. BUS. L.J. 1, 910
(2013) (quoting Statement Regarding the Proposing Release on Crowdfunding,
U.S. Sec. & Exch. Commn, (Oct. 23, 2013) (statement of Commr Kara M.
Stein)).
18. See Regulation Crowdfunding, Securities Act Release No. 33-9974,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-76324, 80 Fed. Reg. 71,388, 71,389 n.5 (Nov. 16,
2015) (codified at 17 C.F.R pt. 227) [hereinafter Regulation Crowdfunding
Final Rules Release].
19. See Frank Vargas et al., Understanding Crowdfunding: The SECs
New Crowdfunding Rules and the Universe of Public Fund-Raising, ABA BUS.
L. TODAY (Dec. 2015), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2015/12/03
_vargas.html.
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solicitation and advertising under [SEC] Rule 506(c) for an offerings
made solely to accredited investors. Title III of the JOBS Act ordered
amended Section 4(a) of the Securities Act of 1933 to allow for
solicitation and advertising in to [sic] unaccredited investors in a
limited offering.20
This limited offering available to everyone, not merely
accredited investors, most closely parallels the models of
portals like Kickstarter and Indiegogo.21
There are at least two different categories of crowdfunding
models in existence: donation-based, and equity-based.22 Under
models in the donation-based category, the individual
contributor donates money to a worthy cause with no
expectation of receiving anything in return.23 For projects
where the fundraising goal does not involve making a product
or supporting a business, donation-based models may be the
most logical form of crowdfunding.24
20. Id.
21. See id. While relaxing the advertising restrictions under Rule 506(c)
allows for an unlimited offering to accredited investors, that group is likely too
small to qualify as the crowd. See id. These are individuals with high enough
earnings or net worth that the traditional investor protection rationale for
securities regulation is weakened. Id. Accredited investor is a defined term
under SEC Regulation D. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a) (2016) (alternative income or
net worth requirements). It is estimated that, even considering the SECs
recent deliberations to increase Regulation Ds accredited investor income and
net worth thresholds, the number of accredited investors in the entire country
does not exceed 8.5 million (i.e., somewhere between 23% of the population).
Accord Devin Thorpe, SEC Mulls Changes to Accredited Investor Standards,
18 Crowdfunders React, FORBES (July 15, 2014, 12:32 PM), http://www.forbes
.com/sites/devinthorpe/2014/07/15/sec-mulls-changes-to-accredited-investor-
standards-18-crowdfunders-react/ (indicating, via a SeedInvest estimate of
approximately 8.75 million accredited investors under then-current
definitions, that the number of accredited investors [could be reduced] from
8.5 million to just 3.75 million.).
22. Vargas et al., supra note 19. The various crowdfunding
services/platforms available often mix & match their offerings to include part
pure-donation and part rewards-based campaigns. See, e.g., Im Raising Funds
for . . ., INDIEGOGO, https://www.indiegogo.com/campaigns/new#/choose-your-
platform (last visited Oct. 25, 2016) (allowing alternative models for a project
or a cause). For the purposes of this Note, equity crowdfunding should be
considered synonymous with securities crowdfunding.
23. See Vargas, et al. supra note 19. An example of this kind of model is
GoFundMe. GOFUNDME, www.gofundme.com (last visited Oct. 25, 2016).
24. While not all platforms offering donation-based crowdfunding portals
support tax-deductible donations, several do. Vargas, et al., supra note 19
(mentioning options available to verified 501(c)(3) non-profits through
GoFundMe and Indiegogo). Crowdfunding models based on donations
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Rewards-based crowdfunding campaigns are a variation on
the typical type of model within the donation-based model
category.25 The general process for this model is to ask a large
number of people for financial support based only on the
perceived merit of a project or cause.26 In rewards-based
crowdfunding, the projects creator also offers some small token
in exchange for a contributors support.27 Such rewards can
range from VIP access during the creative process, to branded
memorabilia from the campaign, to a first-run version of the
final project output itself.28
Finally, in an equity-based model, a contributorprobably
more accurately described as an investor, in this casegives
money to a project creator in exchange for some future return
based on the projects profits.29 This return can come in several
forms, including common or preferred stock and convertible
debt obligations.30 In these cases, such an exchange of an
instead of the offer and sale of securitiesdo not trigger securities regulation.
Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 77a (2012).
25. See Vargas et al., supra note 19 (defining crowdfunding as raising
money from a potentially unlimited number of people over the Internet).
26. Id.
27. See Vargas et al., supra note 19. Traditionally, these crowdfunding
campaigns target the 3 Fs of investors: Friends, Family, and Fools. By way of
example, in return for crowdfunding support of the University of Minnesota
Law Schools Theatre Of the Relatively Talentless (TORT) 2016 musical
production, the author promised a mention in this Note to any member of his
interpersonal network who donated. So: thanks Mom, Katie, and Marshall &
Katie (all friends and family; none fools)! See Thank You to Our Crowdfunding
Supporters!, TORT, http://umntort.org/thank-you-to-our-crowdfunding-
supporters (last visited Feb. 11, 2016).
28. Carol Benovic & Sid Orlando, Need Some Reward Ideas? Here are 96
of Them, KICKSTARTER: THE KICKSTARTER BLOG (Apr. 16, 2015), https://www
.kickstarter.com/blog/need-some-reward-ideas-here-are-96-of-them. For an
absurd crowdfunded project with even more absurd rewards, see Zack
Danger Brown, Potato Salad, KICKSTARTER, https://www.kickstarter.com
/projects/zackdangerbrown/potato-salad/description (last visited Oct. 25, 2016)
(listing as rewards for donations of $110 and up: THE PLATINUM POTATO:
Receive the recipe book, the shirt and the hat along with a bite of the potato
salad, a photo of me making the potato salad, a thank you posted to our
website and I will say your name out loud while making the potato salad.).
29. See Vargas, et al., supra note 19.
30. Joseph Hogue, Types of Crowdfunding Deals and Investment,
CROWD101.COM (Aug. 2, 2016), http://www.crowd101.com/types-crowdfunding-
deals-investment/ (explaining the different investment opportunities
crowdfunding could provide).
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investment for a share of future profits triggers the application
of federal and state securities laws.31
In general terms, whenever an issuer offers or sells a share
of profits in exchange for capital, that issuer is offering a
security.32 The SEC is responsible for protecting investors by
policing the federal securities arena.33 Under the Securities Act
of 193334 (Securities Act), an offer or sale of a security can
trigger substantial registration requirements.35 But, where
there is [sic] an exemption available,36 an issuer of securities
may be relieved of some or all registration requirements.
Several exemptions existed prior to the JOBS Act, including:
Regulation A, Section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act and the
related provisions of Regulation D, and Section 3(a)(11) of the
Securities Act.37 On the other hand, and as discussed in more
31. Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 77aa (2012); see also Joan
MacLeod Heminway, Crowdfunding and the Public/Private Divide in U.S.
Securities Regulation, 83 U. CIN. L. REV. 477, 479 (2014) (The archetypal
business or project that [engages in crowdfunding seeks] business financing in
a very unrestricted way: by openly soliciting funds over the Internet from a
large, varied group of people. This type of securities transaction looks and
feels like a public offering and, until the JOBS Act was signed into law, was
regulated as one.).
32. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(a)(1) (definition of security). Of course, like
many robust legal regimes, there are numerous exceptions to this broad
statement. Indeed, the legal analysis for defining a security can take up
several weeks of an introductory law school course dedicated to securities
regulation. See generally JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION:
CASES AND MATERIALS 2589 (Aspen Publishers 7th ed. 2013) (providing an
extensive case study for the multiple types of security under the Acts). For
the purposes of this Note, it will be assumed without deciding that most, if not
all, equity crowdfunding transactions will meet the definition of an offer
and/or sale of securities under federal and state laws.
33. See 15 U.S.C. § 78d (2012); see also The Investors Advocate: How the
SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital
Formation, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMMN, https://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo
.shtml (last visited Oct. 26, 2016) (The mission of the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission is to protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and
efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.).
34. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a to 77aa.
35. See 15 U.S.C. § 77f (Registration of securities).
36. Hopkins & Hopkins, supra note 17, at 7.
37. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.251 (2016) (Regulation A); 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(2)
(2012) (Securities Act Section 4(a)(2)); 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.501 to .508 (Regulation
D); 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(l1)) (Securities Act Section 3(a)(11)). See generally
Hopkins & Hopkins, supra note 17, at 79 (outlining the details of each
registration exemption). In addition to creating securities crowdfunding, the
JOBS Act also tweaked several of the then-existing exemptions, and created
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detail below, only some of these exemptionsin particular the
exemptions under existing Section 3(a)(11) and new Section
4(a)(6)38are truly applicable to a discussion of crowdfunding
as it relates to securities law.39 In light of the considerable
literature critiquing the use of existing federal securities
exemptions in the crowdfunding context,40 this Note will focus
on those exemptions most likely to appeal to companies as
potential substitutes to crowdfunding.
B. PREVIOUS EXEMPTIONS AGAINSTWHICH TO JUDGE THE
FEDERAL CROWDFUNDINGMODEL
The crowdfunding exemption under Title III required the
SEC to promulgate final rules.41 Prospective crowdfunders
awaited these rules eagerly.42 However, the proposed rules
released by the SEC in 2013 were met with vigorous criticism
some new exemptions. To the extent they are not applicable to a comparison to
crowdfunding, they are outside the scope of this Note.
38. 15 U.S.C. § 77d(a)(6).
39. Arguably, the crowdfunding label should apply only when there are
sufficiently large groups of potential investors (i.e., a crowd), and the three
other exemptions are only or mainly available to sophisticated or
accredited investorsroughly 23% of the U.S. population by some
estimates. See Thorpe, supra note 21 (Around 7% of the US population could
qualify as accredited investors today. Instead of reducing the number of people
who can invest in privately held companies, we should be seeking ways to
expand the growth of investments in small businesses.) (internal quotations
omitted). The SEC seems to agree that allowing solicitation to a large group,
only a handful of whom would otherwise qualify to contribute, is antithetic to
the spirit of a crowdfunding campaign. See Regulation Crowdfunding Final
Rules Release, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,389 n.5 (Although this rule facilitates the
type of broad solicitation emblematic of crowdfunding, crowdfunding is
premised on permitting sales of securities to any interested person, not just to
investors who meet specific qualifications, such as accredited investors.).
40. E.g., Hopkins & Hopkins, supra note 17. For perspectives of industry
participants and analysts, see the 480+ letters submitted as public comments
after the 2013 proposed Regulation Crowdfunding rules. Comments on
Proposed Rule: Crowdfunding, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMMN., https:/ www.sec
.gov/comments/s7-09-13/s70913.shtml (last visited Oct. 25, 2016) (Release No.
33-9470; File No. S7-09-13).
41. See The JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306, 320 (2012)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (establishing a 270-
day target after adoption of the Act for SEC rulemaking).
42. See, e.g., Stacy Cowley, Tired of Waiting for U.S. to Act, States Pass
Crowdfunding Laws and Rules, N.Y. TIMES (June 3, 2015), http://nyti.ms
/1GZIym1 (commenting in June 2015 that entrepreneurs were still waiting for
SEC rulemaking to be completed).
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from the small business community. 43 In fact, the SEC
received over 485 comment letters on the Proposing Release,
including from professional and trade associations, investor
organizations, law firms, investment companies and
investment advisers, broker-dealers, potential funding portals,
members of Congress, the Commissions Investor Advisory
Committee, state securities regulators, government agencies,
potential issuers, accountants, individuals and other interested
parties.44 Among the more prevalent critiques were claims
that the regulatory regime proposed would cost too much to
administer and would therefore preclude the very businesses
the JOBS Act hoped to benefit from access to securities
crowdfunding.45 Indeed, this echoes many criticisms of
traditional securities regulation stressing that, as applied to
small business capital formation, the costs of qualification
and/or compliance are prohibitive.46 While the SEC reviewed
and considered the large volume of responses, Title III
crowdfunding remained unavailable for small businesses.47
43. See Regulation Crowdfunding Final Rules Release, 80 Fed. Reg. at
71,389.
44. Id. (footnote omitted).
45. The Commissioners did at least consider giving the smallest of
businesses a break from the rules:
We also considered whether there should be an exemption from
coverage of the rule, or any part of the rule, for small issuers.
However, because the rules have been designed to implement
crowdfunding, which focuses on capital formation by issuers that are
small entities, while at the same time provide appropriate investor
protections, we do not believe that small issuers should be exempt, in
whole or in part, from the proposed rules.
Id. at 71,535. In the end, the SEC erred on the side of caution for investor-
protection. Id. ([W]e do not believe we should establish different
requirements for small entities . . . that engage in crowdfunding.). This may
not be such a bad thing for investors. See Sara Hanks & Andrew Stephenson,
The Role of Counsel in Intrastate Securities Crowdfunding, ABA BUS. L.
TODAY, (Dec. 2015) http://www.americanbar.org/publications/blt/2015/12/04
_hanks.html. (Entrepreneurs are optimistic by nature. That optimism can
lead to omissions of required information for investors.).
46. As evidence for the validity of this argument, look no further than the
relaxed disclosure and compliance requirements under many of the
registration-exempt securitiese.g., under Regulation A, Regulation D, etc.
discussed more fully later in this Part I.B.
47. The JOBS Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306, 320 (2012) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.). Clearly, Oct. 31, 2015 was
significantly more than 270 days past the JOBS Acts enactment on Apr. 10,
2012.
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Companies were not wholly without options in the
meantime, however. The notice and comment procedures
merely delayed the addition of JOBS Act crowdfunding to the
list of fundraising options available to companies.48 For a long
time prior to 2012, small businesses had several options for
raising capital under federal and state securities law.49 These
exemptions shielded companies from the long reach of the
SECs enforcement arm.50 However, none of these options had
been particularly attractive for the type of startups the JOBS
Act hoped to jumpstart.51
One example, Regulation A,52 was amended to its current
form pursuant to the JOBS Act.53 An exempt issuer under the
new Regulation A can now offer up to $50 million of securities
for public sale,54 with no restriction on general advertising or
solicitationa key component to the success of crowdfunding.
Regulation A securities may be offered and sold to accredited
investors, and also to unaccredited investors subject to
48. See LaCroix, supra note 12 (describing how the SECs delayed
enactment of the JOBS Act affected crowdfunding).
49. Cf., e.g., Helping Small Businesses and Protecting Investors, U.S. SEC.
& EXCH. COMMN (Mar. 25, 2015) (statement of Commr. Luis A. Aguilar),
https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/helping-small-businesses-and-protecting-
investors.html (describing the severe decline in Regulation A notifications
filed by small businesses since 1960).
50. See id. (Congress has provided the Commission with authority to
pass rules to make it easier for small businesses to raise capital.).
51. See, e.g., Regulation Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,389
(Limitations under existing regulations, including purchaser qualification
requirements for offering exemptions that permit general solicitation and
general advertising, have made private placement exemptions generally
unavailable for crowdfunding transactions, which are intended to involve a
large number of investors and not be limited to investors that meet specific
qualifications.).
52. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251 (2016).
53. For a brief summary of the major provisions of amended Regulation A
(sometimes referred to as Regulation A+), see Amendments to Regulation A: A
Small Entity Compliance Guide*, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMMN (June 18, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/info/smallbus/secg/regulation-a-amendments-secg.shtml.
54. See Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under
the Securities Act (Regulation A), Securities Act Release No. 33-9741,
Exchange Act Release No. 34-74578, Trust Indenture Act Release No. 39-2501,
80 Fed. Reg. 21,806, 21,807 (Apr. 20, 2015) [hereinafter Regulation A Final
Amendments] (Overview); see also Helping Small Businesses and Protecting
Investors, supra note 49 ([T]he Commission is increasing the dollar amount
that can be raised from $5 million to $50 million.).
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individual investment limits.55 This broad base of customers
from which to solicit offers is also consistent with crowdfunding
models.56 However, companies making these offerings are
subject to onerous and ongoing reporting requirements.57 The
costs of initial qualification and ongoing compliance can reach
into the hundreds of thousands of dollars annually.58 These
costs alone, despite otherwise favorable factors, ultimately
dooms Regulation A as a viable option for many, if not most,
startups.59
A private placement offering under the complementary
Section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act60 and the Rule 506 safe
harbor of Regulation D61 offers a popular alternative to the
heavy regulatory burdens associated with Regulation A
offerings.62 Properly done, a private placement offering allows
for unlimited fundraising.63 The hallmark of a private
placement is its nonpublic nature; to that end, general
advertising and solicitation would disqualify an attempted
offering under the safe harbor.64 The safe harbor allows for
nonpublic fundraising proposals directed either (1) only to
accredited investors, or (2) to unlimited accredited, and a very
small number of unaccredited but sophisticated, investors.65
Preparation of a private placement memorandum (to avoid
claims of fraud) is arguably less expensive than the disclosure
55. Regulation A Final Amendments, 80 Fed. Reg. at 21,807.
56. See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 6, at 1 (considering a large investor
base to be the major idea behind crowdfunding).
57. Id.
58. See Regulation A Final Amendments, 80 Fed. Reg. at 21,883 (One
commenter estimated the qualification and reporting costs of a Tier 2 issuer to
be approximately $400,000 in the first year and $200,000 annually thereafter
(per issuer).).
59. Id.
60. 15 U.S.C. § 77d (2012).
61. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2016 (providing Rule 506 safe
harbors for offerings using the private placement exemption).
62. See id.
63. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d.
64. MUNCK WILSON MADALA, PRIVATE OFFERINGS UNDER THE SECS NEW
RULES: PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS AND ACTIONS TO CONSIDER NOW 5 (Sept. 23,
2013), http://www.munckwilson.com/sites/default/files/Client%20Alert%209-13
.pdf (An issuer cannot rely on any of the . . . safe harbors if it . . . has
knowledge that the purchaser is not an accredited investor.).
65. See id.
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documents required under Regulation A.66 But, any
sophisticated-but-unaccredited investors must be given
disclosure documents that are generally the same as those
used in registered offerings.67 Further, restricting the crowd
from which to attract investors to only those individuals with
high enough income or net worth to meet the accredited
investor definition can prevent companies with limited
operating history or smaller interpersonal networks from
connecting with the necessary number of investors.68 The
allowance of up to thirty-five additional sophisticated-but-
unaccredited investors surely does not increase the crowd
enough to make up for the costs of preparing their additional
disclosure documents.69 Thus, due to the limited means of
publicizing the offering, a limited pool of potential investors,
and the high costs associated with potential disclosure
requirements, a private placement is not always an ideal option
for small businesses trying to raise startup capital.70
Rules 504 and 505 of Regulation D71 solve some of the
problems of Regulation A and the private placement
exemption.72 In contrast to Regulation A, the preparation of
filing documents under Rules 504 and 505 is less extensive and
less expensive.73 In contrast to private placements, these rules
66. See Mike Goodrich, Raising Money: What is a Private Placement
Memorandum (PPM) and When Do You Need One?, WELD FOR BIRMINGHAM
(June 19, 2012), http://weldbham.com/blog/2012/06/19/raising-money-what-is-
a-private-placement-memorandum-ppm-and-when-do-you-need-one
(estimating that a skilled attorney can prepare a private placement
memorandum for around $20,000).
67. See Fast Answers: Rule 506 of Regulation D, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMMN (Oct. 6, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/answers/rule506.htm.
68. See Thorpe, supra note 21 (discussing the small percentage of the U.S.
population that actually meets the Rule 506 thresholds for sophistication and
accreditation, and that [a]round 7% of the US population could qualify as
accredited investors today).
69. But see Darrell Zahorsky, How to Finance Your Business by Private
Placement, https://www.thebalance.com/how-to-finance-your-business-by-priv
ate-placement-2951211 (last updated May 4, 2016) (arguing that despite
private placement not being the most ideal option, it is the best option for
small business owners).
70. But see id.
71. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2016).
72. See generally Zahorsky, supra note 69 (Regulation D is the most
popular form of non-public private placement.).
73. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b) (Rule 504), and 17 C.F.R. § 230.505
(Rule 505), and 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b) (general information requirements for
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also allow for general advertising and solicitation in states with
certain filing requirements or state-based exemptions to be
directed at all investors.74 It would seem, therefore, that these
rules provide an ideal combination for crowdfunding: lower
costs, and a larger crowd. However, it is clear the costs related
to some state filing requirements, which would allow general
advertising as described above, are not insubstantial.75
Additionally, Rule 504 caps the exemption at $1 million in any
twelve month period.76 Rule 505 is capped at $5 million.77 It is
private placement memoranda), with 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(d) (Regulation A
offering conditions), and FORM 1-A, REGULATION A OFFERING STATEMENT
UNDER THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933: GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMMN, https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form1-a.pdf (last visited Feb.
13, 2016) (listing information for Regulation A filings).
74. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(i)(iii). Indeed, the Maine intrastate
crowdfunding model, discussed infra, is based directly on the exemption
available under Rule 504. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 16,304 (6-A)(D)
(2014) (The offering meets the requirements of the federal exemption . . . in
17 Code of Federal Regulations, Section 230.504 (2013)).
75. See A Guide for Small Businesses on Raising Capital and Complying
with the Federal Securities Laws, U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMMN., https://www
.sec.gov/info/smallbus/qasbsec.htm (last modified Feb. 1, 2016) ([New
businesses] must comply with both federal regulations and state securities
laws and regulations in the states where securities are offered and sold.).
76. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(2). Many commentators have suggested that
such a limit is too small to meet the needs of many companies seeking to
access capital markets. See Kristin A. Gerber & Samuel Effron, Regulation
Crowdfunding: Long Wait Is Over, But Is Equity Crowdfunding D.O.A.?, NATL
L. REV. (Dec. 8, 2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/regulation-
crowdfunding-long-wait-over-equity-crowdfunding-doa, and the accompanying
parenthetical quote. Indeed, this is almost identical to a criticism commonly
voiced as to Regulation Crowdfunding, that the fundraising limit is too small
to justify the costs of compliance. See Letter from Youngro Lee, Esq., Co-
Founder & CEO, NextSeed TX LLC, to Brent Fields, Secy, U.S. Sec. & Exch.
Commn (Jan. 7, 2016) (Re: File Number S7-22-15), at n.1 (noting that, by the
SECs own estimates, even small-scale federal crowdfunding issuers will likely
incur costs of over $20,000 per issuance). The SEC recognizes this possibility,
and is currently considering a proposal to increase the fundraising limit under
Rule 504 to $5 million. See Exemptions To Facilitate Intrastate and Regional
Securities Offerings, Securities Act Release No. 33-9973, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-76319, 80 Fed. Reg. 69,786, 69,801 (proposed Oct. 30, 2015)
[hereinafter Rule 147 Proposal] (Increasing the offering limit from $1 million
to $5 million may also make the Rule 504 exemption more attractive to start-
up companies seeking capital financing . . . .). Editors Note: In the same
release that finalized the Rule 147 amendments, the SEC did increase the
Rule 504 offering limit to $5 million, and added bad-actor disqualifications to
the rule. The SEC also repealed Rule 505, effective 180 days after publication
in the Federal Register. See Final Rule 147/147A Rules, 81 Fed. Reg. at
83,494, and accompanying text, supra note 14.
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therefore likely that some businesses are caught in the gap
where these fundraising limits make any cost savings moot
because the company simply cannot raise its desired capital
using these Rules.78
Prior to the JOBS Acts enactment, therefore, there was no
one ideal model for companies seeking to raise capital using
federal securities law exemptions.79 The SEC rulemaking
delays only exacerbated the problem.80 One final federal
exemptionSection 3(a)(11) of the Securities Act, and its Rule
147 safe harborprovided a somewhat workable alternative for
purely intrastate offerings.81 But, as will be outlined in the
next section, even that exemption is an imperfect solution to
the problem of how to develop a large enough crowd to raise
enough money without violating securities law.
C. PREVIOUS EXEMPTIONS AGAINSTWHICH TO JUDGE THE
INTRASTATE CROWDFUNDINGMODELS
Offerings of securities can trigger additional state level
securities regulation under blue sky laws.82 The Securities
Act expressly preserve[s] the jurisdiction of state securities
commissions to regulate securities activity outside the
jurisdiction of the SEC.83 Even when it might otherwise fall
outside the scope of federal securities lawsby being offered
entirely in-state and with no general solicitation or advertising,
77. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505(b)(2). Compare this to the $50 million under
Regulation A or absence of limit under a private placement. Editors Note:
Rule 505 has been repealed, effective 180 days after publication in the Federal
Register. See Final Rule 147/147A Rules, 81 Fed. Reg. at 83,494, and
accompanying text, supra note 14.
78. 17 C.F.R. § 230.505.
79. See PRIVATE PLACEMENT: SELECTED EXEMPTION AND DISCLOSURE
ISSUES AFTER THE JOBS ACT, FAIRFIELD & WOODS P.C., http://www.fwlaw
.com/news/123-private-placements-selected-exemption-disclosure-issues-after-
jobs-act- (last updated Jun. 10, 2016) (describing the many capital-raising
options available to small businesses following the JOBS Act).
80. See LaCroix, supra note 12.
81. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (2016) (Rule 147).
82. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky
Laws, 70 TEX. L. REV. 347, 348 (1991) (tracing the etymology of the blue sky
name, and explaining why these laws exist).
83. See id., at 348; see also 15 U.S.C. § 77r (2012). But cf. National
Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-290, 110 Stat.
3416 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (preempting
certain state level regulation for securities offered under federal exemptions).
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for example84an offering can still be restricted under a states
blue sky authority.85 To the extent that small businesses want
to take advantage of securities crowdfunding, their offerings
will need to comply with all applicable state and federal
regulatory regimes.86
As frustrations grew around the SECs delay in releasing
final crowdfunding rules, state legislatures began to take
matters into their own hands.87 To avoid a situation where an
issuer might comply with state law but still run afoul of federal
mandates, many states adopted crowdfunding models
legislated entirely within preexisting federal exemptions.88
Section 3(a)(11) of the Securities Act exempts from registration
any offering that is offered and sold entirely to residents of the
state where the company does most of its business.89 SEC Rule
147 provides a safe harbor for compliance with Section
3(a)(11).90 Compliance with both of these requirements exempts
an issuer from SEC regulation. One example of state legislation
using this model is MNvest, the Minnesota crowdfunding
statute signed into law in June 2015 and effective as of June
2016 (hereafter, the Minnesota model).91
An alternative model has arisen in at least two other
states: Maine92 (hereafter the Maine model) and
84. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (providing an intrastate offering
exemption).
85. For example, the State of Minnesota provides additional state-level
filing requirements for offerings that are otherwise exempt from registration
under Rule 504 of SEC Regulation D (15 U.S.C. § 77c). See MINN. STAT. §
80A.50(b) (2015) (Small corporation offering registration, or SCOR).
86. The consequences of non-compliance run the gamut from mere denial
of approval of registration statement, all the way through severe criminal
liability. See generally COX ET AL., supra note 32, at 107248 (overview of The
Initial Public Offering).
87. See, e.g., Zeoli Letter, supra note 13 (describing the conflicts between
proposed SEC Rule 147 revisions and intrastate models as well as possible
solutions); see also LaCroix, supra note 12.
88. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 80A.461 (Minnesota).
89. See 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11).
90. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (2015). The safe harbor helps issuers know
exactly when they are doing business entirely within a state. Id.
91. See About, MNVEST.ORG, http://mnvest.org/about (last visited Sept.
24, 2016). MNvest issuers were unable to complete an offering until June 2016
because they simply did not know how to provide the necessary regulatory
disclosures to the Minnesota Department of Commerce. See id.
92. We refer to this as the Maine model because Mississippis
crowdfunding statute actually contains some version of both state-based
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Mississippi.93 The Maine model, takes advantage of a different
federal exemption: Rule 504 of Regulation D.94 Under this
exemption, offerings of $1 million or less in a state with state
securities registration requirements, or that are made entirely
to accredited investors, are also outside the purview of the
SEC.95
As of January 2016, more than half the states have some
crowdfunding legislation on the books.96 The substantial
majority of these state laws use the Section 3(a)(11) model.97
For this reason, and in the interest of providing the most useful
guidance to the greatest number of readers, Part II of this Note
will focus on MNvest as proxy for all state statutes mirroring
Minnesota model.
The major obstacle confronting companies wishing to take
advantage of crowdfunding under the Minnesota model is the
antiquated nature of SEC Rule 147.98 Rule 147 provides a safe
harbor for compliance with the Section 3(a)(11) exemption from
registration for intrastate securities offerings.99 It limits the
safe harbor to offerings where both offers and sales are limited
only to residents of the state where the company does a certain
crowdfunding models. See generally id.; Mississippi Securities Act of 2010,
MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-71-101 to -701(2015) (statutory authority for Rule
7.21tied to federal intrastate under Section 3(a)(11)and Rule 2.04tied to
federal Rule 504 in Regulation D).
93. For a mostly up-to-date chart of all the current, pending, and defeated
state-level crowdfunding statutes, visit the North American Securities
Administrators Associations website. Intrastate Crowdfunding Legislation, N.
AM. SEC. ADMINS. ASSOC., http://www.nasaa.org/industry-resources/corpor
ation-finance/instrastate-crowdfunding-resource-center [click Intrastate
crowdfunding legislation/regulation to view a stored pdf] (last visited Jan. 31,
2016).
94. 17 C.F.R. § 230.504 (2016).
95. See id.; see also Whit Richardson, New Crowdfunding Law Lends
Mainers a Hand, PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Jan. 8, 2015), http://www
.pressherald.com/2015/01/08/new-crowdfunding-law-lends-mainers-a-hand
(Th[e] exemption boils down to: If the investment is under $1 million, the
SEC isnt going to worry about it and leaves the regulation of that offering to
states.).
96. See Intrastate Crowdfunding Legislation, supra note 93.
97. See id.; see, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 80A.461 (2015) (MNvest statutory
codification).
98. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (Part of an issue, person resident, and doing
business within for purposes of section 3(a)(11)).
99. See Rule 147 Proposal, 80 Fed. Reg. at 69,786.
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threshold amount of business.100 The rule purports to give
guidance by provid[ing] objective standards for local
businesses seeking to rely on Section 3(a)(11).101 As applied to
state laws using the Section 3(a)(11) model, however, the
application of Rule 147s standards is not as useful as it might
appear at first blush.
The restrictions placed on Section 3(a)(11) intrastate
offerings in order to comply with Rule 147 are out of step with
commerce in the digital age. The SEC has said that an offering
under the Section 3(a)(11) model does not prohibit general
solicitation or advertising if conducted within the state.102
However, under the Section 3(a)(11) model, companies are
arguably still prohibited from advertising the offering on their
websites and social media platforms because these
communication tools reach beyond state borders and would
likely involve offers to residents outside of the [ ] state.103
Additionally, Rule 147 requires that certain thresholds of
business income, expenditure, and asset holdings occur in
100. 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(a) (investor limitations); 17 C.F.R. §
230.147(c)(2)(i)(iii) (business issuer threshold restrictions); see also Rule
147 Proposal, 80 Fed. Reg. at 69,788 (reciting thresholds, and noting market
participants criticisms thereof).
101. See Rule 147 Proposal, 80 Fed. Reg. at 69,787.
102. See Timothy J. Capen, Tired of Waiting for the SEC, States Adopt




the-sec,-states-adopt-their-w] (last accessed Nov. 25, 2016) ([T]he SEC
. . . stated that the intrastate exemption from registration under Section
3(a)(11) . . . does not prohibit general solicitation or advertising.); see also
Compliance & Disclosure Interpretation Question 141.05, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMMN (last updated Aug. 6, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin
/guidance/securitiesactrules-interps.htm.
103. Capen, supra note 102 (emphasis added); see also Compliance &
Disclosure Interpretation (CDI) Question 141.05, supra note 102. For the most
risk-averse clients, violating the SECs CDIs is likely unfathomable. However,
at least some members of the ABA Business Law Section think that certain
internet-based advertising and solicitation activities should be permissible
while still complying with Rule 147. See Letter from David M. Lynn, Chair,
Fed. Regulation of Sec. Comm., to Brent Fields, Secy, Sec. Exch. Commn
(Apr. 8, 2016) (Re: File Number S7-22-15) (citing earlier CDIs, SEC no-action
letters, and legislative history to argue that the recent CDIs are inconsistent
with the rationale behind the solicitation and advertising prohibitions).
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state.104 Sales to out of state buyers, raw materials sourced
from out of state sellers, and the trend toward geographical
diversification in order to compete in a global marketplace
could all jeopardize an equity crowdfunders compliance with
the exemption.105 Thus, some of the very tools that initially
made donation- and rewards-based crowdfunding so
successfullike the internet and social media platformsare
the same tools which prevent equity crowdfunding from
enjoying immediate widespread use.106
Issuers have used the intrastate crowdfunding laws of both
state models with varying degrees of success and
enthusiasm.107 Some laws stall while state regulatory agencies
continue to finalize rulemaking for the intermediary portals
required under the state rules.108 Other states have had laws
on the books for some time but simply do not seem to have the
interest from investors.109 In certain circumstances, the
104. These requirements are called the 80% tests and are further
discussed in Part II.A, infra.
105. See Andrew Stephenson, Intrastate Crowdfunding: Nice, but Not a
Game Changer, CROWDCHECK: CROWDCHECK BLOG (June 11, 2014), http://
www.crowdcheck.com/blog/intrastate-crowdfunding-nice-not-game-changer
(noting the problems with the intrastate crowdfunding exemptions and that
very few companies have successfully raised funds as a result of the
exemption).
106. See Rule 147 Proposal, 80 Fed. Reg. at 69,788 ([T]he use of the
Internet for offerings makes it difficult for issuers to limit offers to in-state
residents.).
107. See Stephenson, supra note 105.
108. For instance, at the time of initial drafting of this Note (early 2016),
Minnesotas MNvest crowdfunding law required the state Commerce
Department [to] write the rules for how MNvest will be implemented and the
[online intermediary] portals certified. David Fondler, State Enacts MNvest,
to Connect Small Business with Small Investors, TWINCITIES.COM PIONEER
PRESS (June 20, 2015), http://www.twincities.com/2015/06/20/state-enacts-
mnvest-to-connect-small-business-with-small-investors/ (last visited Feb. 1,
2016). The MNvest regulations have since been published, see MNVEST.ORG,
supra note 91, and issuers are just beginning to use them. (The author was
also fortunate enough to have been able to work on one of the first MNvest
offerings in August 2016 as part of his summer associateship at Winthrop &
Weinstine, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, under the supervision of Zach Robins, who
participated in drafting MNvest.).
109. See, e.g., Cowley, supra note 42 (quoting founder of Georgia
crowdfunding portal SterlingFunder arguing investor awareness as major
hurdle to successful projects). Cf. Gerber & Effron, supra note 76 ([T]he
relatively low maximum offerings amounts and investment limitations, will
make Reg. CRWD young companies least appealing option for an equity
financing.).
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regulations surrounding the funding intermediaries (e.g.,
internet portals) may be too burdensome to incentivize enough
players to enter that niche of the market.110 On the other hand,
at least some businesses have been able to successfully avail
themselves of the new state level rules.111 The companies that
seem to have the most success at using the local laws to raise
money tend to be those with existing networks of eager
supporters.112 None of the states, however, are witnessing the
explosion in equity crowdfunding activity contemplated by
Congress when it enacted the JOBS Act.113
D. PUBLICATION OF FINAL RULES FOR REGULATION
CROWDFUNDING, AND PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULE 147
The SEC recently finished its review of comments to the
2013 proposed rules and published final rules entitled
Regulation Crowdfunding on October 31, 2015.114 The final
rules went into effect in May 2016.115 They address many of the
concerns articulated by the business community regarding the
2013 rules, including complaints about the costs of public
accountant review and ongoing reporting obligations for
companies offering securities under Regulation
110. See Gerber & Effron, supra note 76 (Intermediaries, investors and
even directors and officers of intermediaries and issuers will also have
compliance requirements and limitations . . . .).
111. E.g., Rick Romell, MobCraft Beer Becomes First to Use States
Crowdfunding Law, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Sept. 24, 2014), http://archive
.jsonline.com/business/mobcraft-beer-becomes-first-to-use-states-
crowdfunding-law-b99358411z1-276938661.html (last visited Oct. 20, 2016)
(naming a Wisconsin brewery as the first to use states crowdfunding law).
112. Cowley, supra note 42.
113. Id. (Around 95 companies nationwide have filed applications to raise
money using the state laws, according to data compiled by The New York
Times from state regulators.).
114. See Press Release 2015-249, Sec. & Exch. Commn, SEC Adopts Rules
to Permit Crowdfunding, Proposes Amendments to Existing Rules to
Facilitate Intrastate and Regional Securities Offerings (Oct. 30, 2015),
https://www.sec.gov/news/pressrelease/2015-249.html; see also Regulation
Crowdfunding Final Rules Release, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,388 (codified at 17
C.F.R. pt. 227).
115. See Loughran et al., supra note 9, at 1 (Regulation Crowdfunding will
become effective May 16, 2016. The forms that will enable funding portals to
register with the SEC will become effective January 29, 2016.).
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Crowdfunding.116 At the same time, the final rules retain many
of the burdensome disclosure and qualification requirements
originally proposed in 2013, citing the rationale of investor
protection.117 In effect, a company wishing to take advantage of
intrastate securities crowdfunding now has two competing
options: a federal option under Title III/Section 4(a)(6) and
Regulation Crowdfunding, and (if available) a state-based
alternative.118
To complicate matters still further, proposed revisions to
SEC Rule 147 were published in tandem with the final rules
under Regulation Crowdfunding.119 The proposed amendments
respond to industrys concerns regarding the allowable use of
the internet for solicitation and advertising, and the
domiciliary restrictions on businesses seeking the statutory
exemption.120 In addition, and most relevant to issuers
considering using state crowdfunding laws, the proposed
amendments would end the Rules safe harbor status and
instead create an entirely new exemption.121 This is motivated
in part by the desire to update Rule 147 to the reality of
modern business practices.122 As discussed in more detail
below, an issuer will no longer be able to strictly satisfy Section
3(a)(11)s requirements on offers and sales if it takes full
advantage of proposed Rule 147s permission to advertise and
116. See, e.g., Regulation Crowdfunding, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,41921
(addressing complaints regarding the modified accounting reporting
requirements).
117. The JOBS Act bumps up against traditional securities regulation even
where business owners have the best of intentions. See Hanks & Stephenson,
supra note 45 (Entrepreneurs are optimistic by nature. That optimism can
lead to omissions of required information for investors.).
118. See id. (illustrating the variations in state-based securities
crowdfunding).
119. See Press Release 2015-249, Sec. & Exch. Commn, supra note 114.
See generally Rule 147 Proposal, 80 Fed. Reg. at 69,786 (stating the actual
text of the Rule 147 proposal). Editors Note: The Final Rules have since been
published, but not in time to address here before this issue went to print.
120. See Rule 147 Proposal, 80 Fed. Reg. at 69,78788 (under the heading
A. Rationale for Proposed Amendments to Rule 147).
121. Id. at 69,789 (Rule 147, as proposed to be amended, would no longer
fall within the statutory parameters of Section 3(a)(11).). The SECs general
authority to create exemptions is derived from 15 U.S.C. § 77z-3 (2012). Id. at
69,789, n.31.
122. See id. at 69,789, n.32 (stating that the proposed amendments are
meant to encourage state based crowdfunding statutes).
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solicit.123 Additionally, a final rule that changes Rule 147 to a
standalone exemption will therefore necessarily impact the
workings of intrastate crowdfunding.124
The JOBS Acts stated mission to jumpstart business
startups by enabling federally recognized securities
crowdfunding has taken three years longer than expected.125
The SECs October 2015 release of final Regulation
Crowdfunding rules has created a situation where companies
have two possible options for offering and selling securities to
the crowd.126 At the same time, though, the proposed changes
to Rule 147 have created further uncertainty about the future
of the dominant state law solutions to the funding gaps
targeted by the JOBS Act.127 To the extent a potential issuer
qualifies for and still has interest in using either of the federal
or state based crowdfunding models, Part II attempts to
provide some comparative guidance between the two. As a
necessary corollary, Part II first advocates a common sense
solution to the messy situation introduced by the Rule 147
amendment proposal.128
II. ANALYSIS
In this Part II, this Note will describe the proposed
changes to Rule 147 and outline one sensible path forward.
Then, the Note will compare the mechanics of the new federal
rules with the Minnesota model under the assumed solution to
Rule 147 to analyze which, if either, model is preferable to
certain types of small businesses. Through a comparison of how
crowdfunding regulations affect the key players in any
123. Most [s]tate-based crowdfunding provisions generally require that an
issuer, in addition to complying with various state-specific requirements to
qualify for the exemption, also comply with Section 3(a)(11) and Rule 147. Id.
at 69,788 (emphasis added).
124. See, e.g., Zeoli Letter, supra note 13.
125. See The JOBS Act, supra note 3, at 1 (stating the underlying purpose
of The JOBS Act).
126. See Regulation Crowdfunding Final Rules Release, 80 Fed. Reg. at
71,389 (illustrating the two options for offering and selling securities).
127. See id. at 71,488 (Since the passage of the JOBS Act, many U.S.
states have made changes to their securities laws to accommodate intrastate
securities-based crowdfunding transactions.).
128. The common sense solution is substantially similar to the final rules
recently adopted by the SEC. See Editors Note, supra note 14, and the
accompanying citation.
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crowdfunding transactioninvestors, issuers, and
intermediariesthis Part illustrates why issuers might prefer
one model over another.
A. THE PROBLEM WITH AMENDING RULE 147 AS CURRENTLY
PROPOSED
The main problems with current Rule 147 as it relates to
crowdfunding are (1) the restrictions on offers and sales
raise[ ] questions about the proper use of the Internet for
[Section 3(a)(11)] offerings, and (2) [t]he limitation of eligible
issuers only to those that are incorporated or organized in-state
. . . excludes local issuers with local operations that incorporate
or organize in a different state for business reasons.129 At the
time of drafting,130 SEC Rule 147 provides a safe harbor for
securities offerings conducted entirely within a state (i.e., an
intrastate offering) under Section 3(a)(11).131 The Rule
restricts both offers and sales of Section 3(a)(11) securities to
people within one state, and further imposes restrictions in
order for a company to qualify as doing business within a
state.132 The proposed amendment to the rule would eliminate
the prohibition on general advertising and solicitation, and
alter the limitations on issuers in order to do business in state,
but it would also make Rule 147 a standalone exemption
instead of a safe harbor.133
There are several positive aspects included in the Rule 147
proposal, designed to modify certain regulatory requirements
of the rule that no longer comport with modern business
129. Rule 147 Proposal, 80 Fed. Reg. at 69,788.
130. The most recent substantive revisions to this Note occurred in
September 2016. At that time, the SEC had yet to release any updates on its
consideration of the comments provided to its proposed amendments.
131. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.147 (2016); see also 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (2012)
(stating exemption for [a]ny security which is a part of an issue offered and
sold only to persons resident within a single State or Territory, where the
issuer of such security is a person resident and doing business within or, if a
corporation, incorporated by and doing business within, such State or
Territory).
132. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.147.
133. Rule 147 Proposal, 80 Fed. Reg. at 69,788 (The proposed
amendments to Rule 147 would amend these requirements and revise the rule
to allow an issuer to engage in any form of general solicitation or general
advertising.).
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practices or communications technology.134 The current Rules
very strict threshold requirements for a company to be
considered doing business within a state commonly referred
to as the 80% tests135are one example. It was previously
difficult for an issuer to meet all of the 80% tests and failure to
do so would prevent exemption under the original Rule 147.136
Rule 147 as proposed would alter the current requirement of
compliance with all three 80% tests to a more manageable pick
one test approach.137 Further, under Rule 147 as proposed,
companies are doing business in the state where their
principal business activities are carried out,138 so long as one
of the former 80% tests is met139 or a majority of the issuers
employees are based in that state.140 Thus, under Rule 147 as
proposed, a company that is truly local but might otherwise fail
one of the 80% tests141 will not be thereby prevented from
accessing needed capital in the intrastate crowdfunding
market. This should track more closely with modern business
practices without abandoning the SECs desire that the
securities sold in an intrastate offering in one state should have
to come to rest within such state before sales are permitted to
out of state residents.142
134. Id. at 69,78788. This section also notes that compliance with all
three 80% requirements under Rule 147 may unduly restrict[ ] the local
businesses that may rely upon the exemption; see id.
135. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(c)(2)(i)(iii). Under current Rule 147, an
issuer is deemed to be doing business within a state if (i) it derives at least
80% of its income in-state, (ii) it has at least 80% of its assets within the state,
and (iii) it uses at least 80% of its income for business operations in-state. Id.
As currently in force, Rule 147 also requires the issuer to have its principal
office located within the state as well. Id. at subsec. (c)(2)(iv).
136. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(c)(2)(i)(iii) (noting the mandatory nature of
the statutory language).
137. See Rule 147 Proposal, 80 Fed. Reg. at 69,79092, n.49 (II.B.3
(Requirements for Issuers Doing Business In-State)).
138. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(c)(1) (as proposed).
139. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(c)(2)(i)(iii) (as proposed).
140. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.147(c)(2)(iv) (as proposed).
141. The reader can imagine a situation where a Moorhead, Minnesota-
based company might sell more than 20% of its products just across the Red
River in Fargo, North Dakota. The company might also store goods in a Fargo
warehouse, or have a lucrative contract with a Fargo-based buyer, such that
20% of those goods or revenue are derived from out of Minnesota. The
rationale for punishing a company for success in its geographical region, even
if that success means the company cannot strictly comply with all three 80%
tests, is difficult to defend.
142. Rule 147 Proposal, 80 Fed. Reg. at 69,791.
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As proposed to be amended, Rule 147 would also eliminate
the restrictions on general advertising and solicitation of
offers.143 Almost by definition, [c]rowdfunding involves the use
of the Internet.144 In theory, this proposed tweak solves the
problem with internet advertising and solicitation because
issuers no longer have to worry about whether out-of-state
investors might accidentally view online advertising materials
(arguably an offer under many securities law analyses).145
Unfortunately, amending the rule to create a standalone
exemption146 would present latent problems for operation of
state crowdfunding statutes that currently require compliance
with both Section 3(a)(11) and Rule 147.147 For states like
Minnesota, whose crowdfunding statutes require compliance
with both Section 3(a)(11) and Rule 147, making Rule 147 a
standalone exemption would create an illusory option for use of
internet advertising.148 Recall that Section 3(a)(11) provides an
exemption for securities offered and sold only to persons
resident within a single State or Territory.149 Thus, even if an
issuer conducts the offering entirely within a Minnesota model
state hoping to take advantage of Proposed Rule 147s relaxed
internet advertising standards, state law would still require
compliance with Section 3(a)(11), which at least arguably does
not allow offers or sales over the internet.150 If enacted as
143. See id. at 69,789 (II.B.1 Elimination of Limitation on Manner of
Offering).
144. See Hopkins & Hopkins, supra note 17, at 9.
145. See Rule 147 Proposal, 80 Fed. Reg. at 69,789 (stating that any form
of mass media would be permitted when locating potential investors).
146. Id. (As amended, Rule 147 would function as a separate exemption
from Securities Act registration rather than as a safe harbor under Section
3(a)(11).).
147. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 80A.461, subdiv. 3(2) (2015) (codifying the
MNvest requirement for compliance with Section 3(a)(11) and Rule 147).
148. See Rule 147 Proposal, 80 Fed. Reg. at 69,799; see also Zeoli Letter,
supra note 13.
149. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (2012) (emphasis added).
150. Remember, in this scenario Section 3(a)(11) no longer has a defined
safe harbor for offers and sales. Without the prior guidance of Rule 147 CDIs
on which to rely, the arguments by the ABAs Federal Regulation of Securities
Committee that there are still ways to protect issuers who utilize internet
advertising or sales mechanisms, mentioned supra note 103, become less
persuasive.
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proposed, Rule 147 would be giving with one hand while taking
with the other.151
At the time of writing, there are more than twenty five
comment letters filed for comment on the Rule 147 proposals.152
For clients who require a safest-possible, belt-and-suspenders
approach to avoiding securities registration requirements but
still must advertise on the internet, the Rule 147 amendment
would effectively render Minnesota model statutes
unavailable.153 Any solution to this problem will necessarily
involve a balancing of the benefits gained by keeping some of
the proposals against the costs of achieving those desired
results.
B. A SENSIBLE APPROACH TO DEALING WITH RULE 147 AS
PROPOSED
[Editors Note: The SECs November 2016 release of final
rules addressing, inter alia, Rule 147 renders much of the
following discussion more academic than practical. However,
the concerns underlying each hypothetical outcome described
below remain valid. To the extent the analysis below may be
useful when considering future revisions to the rules, we have
preserved it in substantially unchanged form.]
A simple solution, of course, to the problems posed by the
Rule 147 proposal would be to amend Section 3(a)(11) to
remove the words offers and, so that the general solicitation
amendment in Rule 147 could be given its intended permissive
effect for sales in a state which makes use of Proposed Rule
147s permission to advertise and solicit.154 This solution would
not require any action at the state level, would allow Rule 147
151. Zeoli Letter, supra note 13 (In reality, if Rule 147 and Section 3(a)(ll)
are treated separately, Issuers would not be able to avail themselves of the
more permissive Rule 147 provisions the SEC is proposing and still be in
compliance with the state-based crowdfunding.).
152. Comments on Proposed Rule: Proposed Rule Amendments to
Facilitate Intrastate and Regional Securities Offerings, U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMMN, https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-22-15/s72215.shtml (last visited
Oct. 26, 2016).
153. The Rule 147 proposal of course does not directly affect Maine model
states. However, any changes to Rule 504 that increase the offering limits
thereunder will impact the relative desirability of those models in the first
place.
154. Zeoli Letter, supra note 13 (The offer portion of Section 3(a)(11) is
the issue.).
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as proposed to work as its own exemption, solving both the
internet advertising problem and the 80% tests problem.155
However, given the current tense political climate in
Washington, D.C., it may be impossible to create the legislative
momentum necessary to achieve such a major shift in
securities regulation policy.156
One other simple solution would be to leave current Rule
147 as is, and simply rebrand the SECs proposal as Rule
147A.157 The SEC has general exemptive authority under 15
U.S.C. § 77z-3 to accomplish this.158 In this proposed solution,
current Rule 147 would retain its status as a Section 3(a)(11)
safe harbor, complete with the 80% tests requirements and the
perceived ban on internet advertising/sales.159 Rule 147A, on
the other hand, would look exactly like Rule 147 as proposed,
only as a standalone exemption.160 The potential benefits of
having a standalone Rule 147A have already been discussed in
Part II.A. On the negative side, even though Rule 147A is
ideally suited for intrastate crowdfunding of any model, every
(or nearly every) state would need to amend its crowdfunding
statute in order to take advantage of its benefits.161
For its part, the SEC does acknowledge that states that
have crowdfunding provisions based on compliance
with . . . both Section 3(a)(11) and Rule 147, would need to
amend these provisions in order for issuers to take full
advantage of . . . [the Rule 147] amendments.162 As a middle
ground, the SEC could decline to make Rule 147 a standalone
155. See id. (explaining how if this change was implemented, there would
be no conflict between the state and federal level legislation on this issue).
156. See id. (stating that the SEC was aware of the issue, but concluded
that it would be up to the states to change their current statutes on the matter
in order for issuers to benefit from the new amendments).
157. See id. (noting that such a solution would arduously require a total of
twenty-seven states to amend their state statutes on the issue).
158. 15 U.S.C. § 77z-3 (2012).
159. See Zeoli Letter, supra note 13 (Not only would keeping the proposed
amended Rule 147 as a safe harbor under Section 3(a)(11) alleviate the need
for state level amendments and be consistent with the stated purpose of the
proposed amendments, it would clearly be consistent with the existing
opinions and guidance issued by legislators and the SEC to date.).
160. Id.
161. Id. (explaining that every state would need to modify their
crowdfunding statutes in order to benefit from the proposed amended rule
147).
162. Rule 147 Proposal, 80 Fed. Reg. at 69,799.
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exemption, while still adopting the revision to the 80% tests
and clarifying exactly how issuers can use the internet for
advertising and solicitation without violating Section 3(a)(11)
(without eliminating the requirement altogether  a likely
violation of the statute).163 Crowdfunders would gain the
benefits of a more modern regulation, but legislatures would
not have to move mountains (again) to create ideal conditions
for crowdfunding.164 An assumption that the legislature adopts
this proposed middle ground solution will form the basis of
comparison for the remainder of the paper.165
Of course, state legislatures could act first to amend their
crowdfunding statutes to account for the potentially conflicting
nature of Section 3(a)(11) and Rule 147 as proposed.166 This
solution assumes that Rule 147 as proposed becomes its own
standalone exemption under the (theoretical) Rule 147A
analysis above; the effect would also be to leave Section 3(a)(11)
without a safe harbor. In particular, the statutes that require
compliance with both Section 3(a)(11) and Rule 147 could be
reworded to use the disjunctive or. The state legislatures that
have codified certain Rule 147 requirements directly into their
statutesas opposed to merely cross-referencing the federal
rulewould also probably want to revisit their reasons for
doing so.167 Presumably, issuers wanting to advertise or solicit
over the internet would always choose the more permissive
standalone exemption over the now-without-a-safe-harbor
Section 3(a)(11) model. Alternatively, states under the
Minnesota model could amend their statutes to parallel the
163. See Zeoli Letter, supra note 13 (illustrating some ways that the
language may be clarified regarding use of the internet for advertising and
solicitation purposes).
164. See id. (expressing a strong preference for expanding Rule 147 rather
than creating a separate exception).
165. Editors Note: The final rules do not quite adopt the middle ground
solution. They instead import many of the Section 3(a)(11)-compliant revisions
(like modernizing the definition of doing business within a state), while
creating a standalone exemption (complete with permission to internet-
advertise, so long as sales stay within a state) predictably called Rule 147A.
See Final Rule 147/147A Rules, 81 Fed. Reg. at 83,494, and accompanying
text, supra note 14.
166. See Rule 147 Proposal, 80 Fed. Reg. at 69,799 (stating that
suggestions from the states on which approach to take would be helpful); see
also Zeoli Letter, supra note 13.
167. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 80A.461, subdiv. 1(b)(2) (2015) (incorporating
Rule 147s business asset location 80% thresholds to Minnesotas state model).
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Maine model under Regulation Ds Rule 504, which does not
even involve Rule 147.168
Either of these solutions would require multiple state
legislatures to enact amendments, as compared with the
relative simplicity of a single federal amendment.169
Unfortunately, the time needed to mobilize this kind of
legislative willpower might further delay the need for economic
recovery that indeed first prompted the state-level
crowdfunding legislation.170 However, considering the fact that
states may still have legislative momentum due to the
relatively recent passage of their crowdfunding statutes, state
level action may be more likely than a federal solution.171
One final solution would be to simply do nothing and
accept the SECs proposal to amend Rule 147.172 The likely
outcome in this case would be that federal Regulation
Crowdfunding becomes the vastly more attractive option for
issuers. To the extent that issuers operating under Regulation
Crowdfunding do not even need to address the issues of offers
and sales across state lines, it is hard to imagine in this
situation that an issuer would choose a state crowdfunding
program over the federal option.173
Time will be the judge of the wisdom of the SECs ultimate
decision on the matter. In consideration of the limited scope, for
the purposes of discussion in the next section this Note will
assume that the SECs final rules for Rule 147 adopt the
middle ground solution proposed earlier in this section. That
is, the SEC will update the 80% tests and somehow clarify how
issuers can use the internet for advertising and sales without
168. See Rule 147 Proposal, 80 Fed. Reg. at 69,804 (stating that both Rule
147 and Regulation Ds Rule 504 still share the same baseline for economic
analysis).
169. See id. at 69,788 (stating that the current statutory requirements in
Section 3(a)(11) and regulatory requirements in Rule 147 make it difficult for
issuers to take advantage of . . . state crowdfunding provisions).
170. See Zeoli Letter, supra note 13 (explaining that it took two years to get
Illinois crowdfunding statute passed).
171. See Cowley, supra note 42 (illustrating the state lead crowdfunding
legislation movement that arose out of federal governments inaction).
172. See, e.g., Rule 147 Proposal, 80 Fed. Reg. at 69,786 (showing the
unmodified SEC proposal to amend Rule 147).
173. See id. at 69,787 (illustrating how the provisions of the federal
crowdfunding option address only intrastate interactions).
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creating a standalone exemption.174 The Note will further limit
its discussion to a comparison of the new federal Regulation
Crowdfunding with Minnesotas MNvest.
The next section will attempt to isolate and compare the
rules of each model as they apply to the main parties in any
crowdfunding offering: issuers offering and selling securities,
investors buying securities, and, if applicable, the
intermediaries and/or funding portals through which the
securities travel. To the extent the analysis allows, it will also
indicate which equity crowdfunding model might be preferable
to a given issuer.
C. COMPARISON OFMNVEST RULES & REGULATION
CROWDFUNDING RULES
Unfortunately, at the time of writing Regulation
Crowdfunding has only been in force for a few months175 and
the Minnesota Commerce Department has only recently
adopted regulations for MNvest offerings.176 One general
statement that can be made without knowing how all the
details will ultimately work in practice over time: issuers will
probably not be interested in using securities crowdfunding
models unless the requirements are at most comparable to, and
ideally much less restrictive than, the requirements under
other security sales regimes.177
1. Issuer Restrictions
Issuers wishing to take advantage of state crowdfunding
under MNvest must satisfy Section 3(a)(11)s requirement that
the issuer be doing business within the state.178 This will be
true whether Rule 147 lands in the middle ground proposal,
174. Editors Note: As noted several times already, the November 2016
final rules adopt portions similar but not identical to this middle ground
approach. See Final Rule 147/147A Rules, 81 Fed. Reg. at 83,494, and
accompanying text, supra note 14.
175. The regulations went into effect in May 16, 2016. See Regulation
Crowdfunding Final Rules Release, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,388.
176. See MINN. R. 2876.3050 (2016) (Published Electronically: June 22,
2016).
177. See Rachelle Damico, What New SEC Crowdfunding Rules Mean for
Your Small Business, CRAINS DETROIT BUS. (Jan. 10, 2016, 8:00 AM), http://
www.crainsdetroit.com/article/20160110/NEWS/160109872/what-new-sec-
crowdfunding-rules-mean-for-your-small-business (updated Feb. 8, 2016).
178. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(11) (2012).
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or simply does not change at all.179 On the other hand, an
issuer under Regulation Crowdfunding is of course not
restricted to doing business within a state in the same way as
under Minnesota model statutes.180 If the company truly needs
to reach a substantially large crowd to raise its funds, either
because it is relatively unknown in one state181 or relatively
unknown in general because it is so new, Regulation
Crowdfundings model may be the better option.
MNvest disqualifies certain bad actors from acting as
issuers in MNvest offerings.182 So also does Regulation
Crowdfunding.183 Each regime will bring with it certain
compliance costs for issuers hoping to conduct a crowdfunded
securities offering.184 Because each regime requires these kinds
179. See id. (showing that both the middle ground and no change
proposals must satisfy Section 3(a)(11)s requirements).
180. See generally Regulation Crowdfunding Final Rules Release, 80 Fed.
Reg. at 71,388 (showing generally lacking residency requirements). This is,
however, to say nothing of state filing requirements. E.g., Regulation of
Securities, MINN. STAT. ch. 80A.
181. This may be a very salient point for those looking to make the leap
from rewards-based to equity crowdfunding, particularly in light of the fact
that the average geographical distance between a Kickstart project and a
Kickstarter funder is roughly 2,317 miles. Justin Kazmark & Andrew Nichols,
The First 100,000 Funded Kickstarter Projects in 100 Numbers, KICKSTARTER:
THE KICKSTARTER BLOG (Feb. 8, 2016), https://www.kickstarter.com/blog/the-
first-100000-funded-kickstarter-projects-in-100-numbers.
182. See MINN. STAT. § 80A.461, subdiv. 9 (2015). Bad actors are, generally
speaking, individuals who have previously run afoul of securities laws and
regulations, or are under investigation for violations of laws designed to
protect investors.
183. The bad actor disqualification is mandated by the Jumpstart Our
Business Startups Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat 306 (2012) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) (§ 302(d) requires substantially
similar disqualification criteria as in 17 C.F.R. § 230.262).
184. See Kendall Almerico, How the SEC Bad Actor Rules Will Affect
Equity Crowdfunding, CROWDFUNDING INSIDER (Dec. 9, 2013, 11:01 AM),
http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2013/12/28004-sec-bad-actor-rules-will-
affect-equity-crowdfunding (discussing the 2013 proposed rules on
disqualification), which states:
When it comes to bad actors, the proposed JOBS Act rules are just as
burdensome as those that apply to Regulation D offerings . . . . For
those concerned about potential fraud in the equity crowdfunding
world, these bad actor rules provide a comfort zone . . . . But the
tradeoff is another expensive undertaking for a startup company
using equity crowdfunding to raise the $100,000 that banks and angel
investors are no longer interested in funding.
Id.
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of disclosures in order for an issuer to conduct a registration,
neither MNvest nor Regulation Crowdfunding seems to have
any advantage over the other.185 Each will obviously be at a
cost disadvantage to securities offering models that do not
require such ongoing disclosures.186
Both MNvest and Regulation Crowdfunding assume that
some amount of solicitation and advertising must happen over
the internet for a crowdfunding campaign to work.187 Indeed,
one of the SECs cornerstone reasons for proposing to amend
Rule 147 is to bring the antiquated restriction on general
solicitation and advertising into the twenty-first century.188
Both regimes still regulate heavily around the amount and
types of communications that issuers may use to advertise and
solicit offers.189 The SEC and state agencies justify these
requirements for investor protection reasons.190 The theory, as
in other areas of securities law, is that investors should always
be given sufficiently complete and reliable information, and
that this generally happens when the information is centered
in one place.191 As both models restrict the content and
The 2013 proposed rules were eventually adopted in 2015 in substantially the
same form. See Regulation Crowdfunding Final Rules Release, 80 Fed. Reg. at
71,479.
185. By this measure, neither crowdfunding regime is much different from
certain other federal securities fundraising options that require bad actor
disqualification, including Regulation A and Rule 506 of Regulation D. See
Bad Actor Reports, CROWDCHECK, http://www.crowdcheck.com/content/bad-
actor-reports (last visited Oct. 26, 2016).
186. For example, a private placement under Section 4(a)(2) of the
Securities Act. While bad actor requirements are increasingly common, they
are still a relatively new phenomenon. See id.
187. See Fondler, supra note 108 (showing the relevance of the internet in
crowdfunding).
188. See Rule 147 Proposal, 80 Fed. Reg. at 69,79899 (providing the
rationale for proposed amendments to Rule 147).
189. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 80A.461, subdiv. 3(12) (2015) (prescribing the
limits of issuer communication on its own behalf); Regulation Crowdfunding
Final Rules Release, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,542 (final rule § 227.204(b); similar
limitations on content of issuer advertising). Generally, both models prescribe
both a floor and a ceiling for the types of information which must/may be
disclosed in advertising communications.
190. See Regulation Crowdfunding Final Rules Release, 80 Fed. Reg. at
71,390 (explaining that investors must use an SEC approved site when
conducting transactions for investor protection).
191. See generally COX ET AL., supra note 32, at 107 248 (Chapter 4:
Initial Public Offering).
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methods of advertisement in similar ways, neither seems to
have an advantage over the other.192
The annual fundraising limits provide one distinction
between the federal and Minnesota models.193 Issuers using the
Section 3(a)(11)-model state exemptions from registration are
capped at raising $5 million in any twelve-month period.194
Under blue sky authority, Minnesota has further restricted
crowdfunding raises to a maximum of either $2 million or $1
million, depending on the type of review given to the issuers
financial documents.195 In contrast, Regulation Crowdfunding
limits issuers to a total of $1 million in a twelve-month
period.196 Clearly, on this measure the MNvest model wins so
long as an issuer can justify the additional costs of audited or
certified financial statements.197
In both Regulation Crowdfunding and Rule 147 as
proposed the SEC contemplated, and ultimately declined to
adopt, rules that would integrate all securities offerings
pursuant to a federal crowdfunding exemption.198 The upshot of
192. Note that under Regulation Crowdfunding, the SEC allows issuers to
contact investors through the portals, so long as they identify themselves
clearly and the communications are public. See Regulation Crowdfunding
Final Rules Release, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,447 (We are requiring intermediaries
to make the communications on the channels publicly available for viewing.
We believe that this requirement is consistent with the concept of
crowdfunding, as it provides for transparent crowd discussions about a
potential investment opportunity.).
193. See, e.g., id. at 71,389 (stating that the amount raised in a twelve-
month period may not exceed $1 million).
194. See Rule 147 Proposal, 80 Fed. Reg. at 69,831 (proposed rule §
230.147(a)(2)). Rule 147 as proposed does not set an explicit fundraising limit
on offerings conducted pursuant to its exemption, so long as the issuer
registers the securities in the state. Id. (proposed rule § 230.147(a)(1)). As
previously discussed, however, crowdfunding issuers are almost invariably
seeking cost savings, and state registration can entail significant filing fees
and ongoing reporting obligations.
195. See MINN. STAT. § 80A.461, subdiv. 3(5) (2015) (stating the applicable
industry standards for each limit).
196. See Regulation Crowdfunding Final Rules Release, 80 Fed. Reg. at
71,537 (final rule § 227.100(a)(1)). Regulation Crowdfunding also provides
some flexibility in financial documentation requirements depending on the
size of the raise, but still limits yearly offerings to $1 million. Id. at 71,359
(final rule § 227.201(t)).
197. SeeMINN. STAT. § 80A.461, subdiv. 3(5).
198. See generally Rule 147 Proposal, 80 Fed. Reg. at 69,795 96
(integration under proposed Rule 147); Regulation Crowdfunding Final Rules
Release, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,392 (Capital raised through other . . . [means
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this is that, although an issuer may not be able to close the
entire fundraising gap using crowdfunding under either model,
they will be permitted to use both models concurrently, in
addition to any other securities exemptions available.199
Probably the most costly requirements under either the
federal or the intrastate crowdfunding models are those
relating to disclosures and disclosure documents. An investor
familiar with trading securities in the secondary markets will
recognize many of the same features in the crowdfunding
documents as in prospectus requirements.200 MNvests
disclosure requirements are significantly similar, with only
minor variations on the above items,201 not likely to increase or
decrease the cost of creating and updating an offering
document. Issuers are therefore not likely to base their federal
crowdfunding vs. state crowdfunding decisions on this
particular factor.202 The Appendix following Part III below
compares the disclosure requirements under the two
crowdfunding regimes side by side. When comparing to full
securities registration under the Securities Act, however,
issuers are likely to prefer creating an offering document
significantly more limited [for a crowdfunding offering] than
the disclosure that would be required in connection with a
registered offering of securities.203
should] not be counted in determining the aggregate amount sold in reliance
on Section 4(a)(6).). Integration is a serious worry for issuers because of its
potential for loss of exemption.
199. For example, a private placement under Section 4(a)(2) of the
Securities Act.
200. See generally Crowdfunding Part 2 - Initial and Ongoing Disclosure
Requirements, DORSEY & WHITNEY LLP (Nov. 19, 2015), https://www.dorsey
.com/newsresources/publications/client-alerts/2015/11/crowdfunding-initial-
ongoing-disclosure-req; Regulation Crowdfunding Final Rules Release, 80 Fed.
Reg. at 71,537 (final rule § 227.201  Disclosure Requirements). But cf.
Damico, supra note 177 (The type of information that a company pursuing a
crowdfunding offering that has to be disclosed to a non-accredited investor is
typically going to be less than what would have to be disclosed during a
conventional offering.).
201. See MINN. STAT. § 80A.461, subdiv. 4 (titled Required disclosures to
prospective MNvest offering purchasers).
202. See id. (illustrating the relatively minute differences in the MNvest
disclosure requirements compared to the federal requirements).
203. Andrew J. Foley, SEC Adopts Final Rules for Crowdfunding, HARV. L.
SCH. F. CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Nov. 16, 2015), https://corpgov.law
.harvard.edu/2015/11/16/sec-adopts-final-rules-for-crowdfunding (emphasis
added).
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2. Investor Restrictions
One of the most fundamental differences between
MNvests Section 3(a)(11)-based intrastate model and the
general crowdfunding regime under Regulation Crowdfunding
is the confinement of offers and sales only to residents of the
state. The regulatory theory behind allowing relaxed204
restrictions for entirely intrastate offerings holds that resident
investors will more easily be able to monitor their investments
if the company is close by.205 Although Rule 147 as proposed
increases the pool of available issuers,206 thereby increasing the
pool of potential investment opportunities, the possibility exists
for investor confusion when a companys out of state rules
under the corporate internal affairs doctrine207 conflict with the
corporate rules of the state of the offering. It may be possible to
resolve this regulatory worry by pointing to the fact that,
although the possibility for confusion is arguably increased, it
is balanced by the cost savings in regulatory enforcement
actions due to the proximity of companies to the regulatory
agencies themselves.208
To obtain the safe harbor under Rule 147 as proposed,
Minnesota model issuers must use a state exemption that
limits in some way the amount of securities [a]n investor may
purchase in such offering (as determined by the appropriate
204. See supra Part II.C.1 (discussing surrounding analysis). It is not
entirely clear that MNvests requirements are any more relaxed than those
of Regulation Crowdfunding. The biggest difference is the increased
fundraising limit. Id.
205. See Rule 147 Proposal, 80 Fed. Reg. at 69,790 (The Section 3(a)(11)
intrastate offering exemption allows businesses to raise money within the
state from investors who are more likely than those outside the state to be
familiar with the issuer and its management.).
206. See id. at 69,817 (defining a companys place of business under the
proposed Rule 147, which would have the effect of re-patriating companies
organized in another state, like Delaware, back into the state where their
main business activities take place); see also id. at 69,790 91 (2. Elimination
of Residence Requirement for Issuers.).
207. See Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Origins of the Internal
Affairs Doctrine, 32 J. CORP. L. 33, 33 (2006) (explaining that under this
doctrine, a corporations internal business affairs are governed according to
the law of the state of incorporation, and that this need not necessarily be the
same as the place where a corporation conducts its business).
208. Otherwise, the Minnesota securities administrator might have
difficulty monitoring and prosecuting fraud for companies headquartered in,
say, Delaware.
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authority in such state).209 The annual limit under MNvest for
an individual non-accredited investor is $10,000 in any single
offering, regardless of actual income or net worth (assuming
they are still low enough to remain non-accredited).210 Many
critics attack individual investor limits as paternalistic in
nature, both over- and under-inclusive.211 For instance, an
accredited investors other investments could be so illiquid that
allowing an additional $10,000 only exacerbates liquidity
issues. On the other hand, individual investors that do not
technically meet the accredited investor income or net worth
thresholds may otherwise have sophisticated market
knowledge and sufficient savings that regulatory agencies need
not worry about protecting them from the dangers of fraudsters
or business failures.212 On balance, and to the extent that at
least some investor protection is explicitly a securities
regulation agencys mission,213 Minnesotas limit seems neither
clearly arbitrary nor unreasonable.
Under the final rules of Regulation Crowdfunding,
an investor will be limited to investing: (1) the greater of: $2,000 or 5
percent of the lesser of the investors annual income or net worth if
either annual income or net worth is less than $100,000; or (2) 10
209. See Rule 147 Proposal, 80 Fed. Reg. at 69,831 (illustrating proposed
rule § 230.147 (a)(2)(ii)) and identifying the Minnesota Department of
Commerce as securities regulator).
210. See MINN. STAT. § 80A.461, subdiv. 3(7) (2015) ([N]o single purchaser
may purchase more than $10,000 in securities of the MNvest issuer under this
exemption in connection with a single MNvest offering unless the purchaser is
an accredited investor). Note that accredited investors, as defined under
Minnesota law, are not restricted in their investment. Id. Theoretically, this
means a single angel accredited investor could fund the bulk of a project
while unaccredited investors make up the rest of the investment.
211. See Commr Michael S. Piwowar, Dissenting Statement at Open
Meeting on Crowdfunding and Small Business Capital Formation, U.S. SEC. &
EXCH. COMMN (Oct. 31, 2015), https://www.sec.gov/news/statement/piwowar-
regulation-crowdfunding-147-504.html (asserting that requiring limits on
crowdfunding at a federal level does not adequately allow states to protect
their citizens, particularly given the vast difference in size between states like
California and Wyoming, for example).
212. A paradigmatic example would be a law school professor who teaches
a course on securities regulation. Presumably, this qualified individual has
the kind of market sophistication to fully appreciate the inherent risks of
investing, even though her salary or net worth may not qualify her for
accredited investor status.
213. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2012) ([When making rules,] the [SEC] shall
also consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the action will
promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.).
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percent of the lesser of the investors annual income or net worth,
not to exceed an amount sold of $100,000, if both annual income and
net worth are $100,000 or more.214
This contrasts with MNvests limits in two ways: (1)
creating a maximum investment even for accredited
investors,215 and (2) creating a tiered system for non-accredited
investors. As accredited investors are not the target audience of
securities crowdfunding (because they have other simpler
investment options, like private placements), we will not
consider the first difference. In the second difference, as
compared to MNvest, Regulation Crowdfunding basically cuts
the maximum possible yearly investment in half for non-
accredited investors with either annual income or net worth
under $100,000.216 However, for non-accredited investors with
net worth / annual income just below the $1,000,000 / $200,000
thresholds (but each over $100,000), the annual investment
limit is effectively double the MNvest limit.217 Compared side
by side with MNvest, Regulation Crowdfunding can sometimes
be a more attractive option, especially for issuers seeking to
minimize the number of overall crowdfunding investors.218
Under Rule 147 as proposed, and MNvest by extension, a
security sold pursuant to the exemptions must come to rest
within the state for a period of nine months after sale.219 Such
214. Regulation Crowdfunding Final Rules Release, 80 Fed. Reg. at 71,394
(including an illustrative chart describing some possible scenarios).
215. This reflects a concern of the SEC that even investors with substantial
net worth may still not be able to weather the financial hit if the crowdfunding
securities became worthless. Cf. id. (We are concerned about the number of
households where there is a sizeable gap between net worth and annual
income, and the ability of these households to withstand the risk of loss.
According to Commission staff analysis of the data in the 2013 Survey of
Consumer Finances, approximately 20% of U.S. households with net worth
over $100,000 have annual income under $50,000.).
216. For example, even if a persons annual income and net worth were
just $.01 shy of the $100,000 threshold, their maximum investment per year
would be just shy of $5,000 (i.e., 5% of almost-$100,000).
217. In other words: 10% of the lesser of net income or annual worth (i.e.,
almost-$200,000, in this example) would be just shy of $20,000 (double the
MNvest non-accredited individual investor limit).
218. It is important to remember that, to adapt an iconic phrase from an
iconic artist, mo investors, mo problems. See Damico, supra note 177 (More
investors mean more people have a say in a company, which could be a
concern [later] for venture capital firms.).
219. See Rule 147 Proposal, 80 Fed. Reg. at 69,83132 (proposed §
230.147(f)).
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a restriction gives rise to criticisms that lack of freedom to
resell within that time period impairs the investors liquidity
interests.220 This restriction makes sense when satisfying the
statutory requirements to qualify an offering as truly
intrastate, but perhaps not anywhere else. Twenty-first
century investors expect to be able to trade their securities if
they become dissatisfied with their investment.221 The SEC
responds to those criticisms by asserting their mandate to
protect all investors from securities fraud on the part of
issuers.222 In effect, however, this gives an issuer a nine-month
statutory window in which to gamble risk-free with investor
money.223 Investors will not have significant voting or control
interests as a result of their crowdfunding purchases.224 In the
absence of a meaningful vote on corporate affairs, the investors
main tool to express distaste with managements decisions
would be to vote with their dollars and sell out. If market price
220. See, e.g., Regulation Crowdfunding Final Rules Release, 80 Fed. Reg.
at 71,439 n.731 (noting the SEC Investor Advisory Committees suggestion for
development of a sample crowdfunding investor guide highlighting the lack of
liquidity for securities sold in these transactions).
221. See generally Scott Shane, Will Equity Crowdfunding Buyers Be Able
to Sell Their Shares?, ENTREPRENEUR: READY TO LAUNCH (June 30, 2015),
https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/247832 (discussing the struggles equity
crowdfunders may encounter when attempting to sell in a secondary market).
This expectation may be particularly true of crowdfundings target small
investor/investment class, whose previous experience with securities
ownership might be limited to highly liquid stocks or mutual funds traded on
high-volume national exchanges. See generally id.
222. E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2012) ([When making rules,] the [SEC] shall
also consider, in addition to the protection of investors, whether the action will
promote efficiency, competition, and capital formation.).
223. See, e.g., Antone Johnson, The Great Crowdfunding Train Wreck of
2013, GUST (Mar. 19, 2012), http://blog.gust.com/crowdfunding-train-wreck
(discussing the classic principal-agent problems triggered when small
investorsas in crowdfundingdo not individually have the economic power
to compel strong attention from their fiduciaries).
224. See id. It is unrealistic to believe that issuers under crowdfunding
statutes will want to give away significant control of the company during the
issue any more than companies conducting traditional securities offerings. In
fact, some proposed crowdfunding transactions use novel securities-conversion
features that eventually remove any control features from the investment. See
Robb Mandelbaum, Should You Crowdfund Your Next Business?, INC.COM
(May 2014), http://www.inc.com/magazine/201405/robb-mandelbaum/jobs-act-
crowdfunding-problems.html (describing investor confusion when a
prospective issuer explained the conversion features to potential members of
the crowd).
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for resale will truly reflect an efficient market,225 and the
securitys value will decrease the same amount in nine months
regardless of the beneficial owner, then it makes no more sense
to lock in an initial investor for some time period than it does to
lock in someone after a bad blind date.
To the extent that Regulation Crowdfunding prevents
resale of crowdfunded securities for one year226 it is not any
better than those states using the Minnesota model. In fact,
stretching out the time restriction actually increases the
window where the first owner becomes stuck with a bad egg, no
matter how early they discover it. Coming to rest within a state
at least helps satisfy the statutory exemption requirement for
intrastate offerings; such a restriction on resale for securities
offering under the federal model seems less justified at best
and potentially more harmful to initial investors at worst.
Investors might therefore find the MNvest model a more
attractive investment vehicle.
3. Intermediary/Portal Restrictions
The paradigmatic crowdfunding operation processes
investment through an internet based intermediary, sometimes
called a portal, and MNvest is no exception.227 A portal can be
roughly analogized to a broker-dealer in classic securities
transactions.228 In order to avoid registration requirements at a
federal level under Rule 147 as proposed, an issuer has two
options: register at the state level, or conduct the offer and sale
225. See generally COX ET AL., supra note 32, at ch. 3 (description and
critiques of the efficient capital market hypothesis).
226. See Regulation Crowdfunding Final Rules Release, 80 Fed. Reg. at
71,47576 (outlining the rationale behind resale restrictions). Note that resale
restrictions in general are slightly different than coming to rest
requirements for intrastate deals in particular, but they have much the same
effect.
227. See MINN. STAT. § 80A.461, subdiv. 3(3) (2015) (requires sales
exclusively through a MNvest portal). While both MNvest and Regulation
Crowdfunding technically allow for traditional dealer-brokers to process
transactions, it is the use of internet portals that most closely resembles the
rewards-based platforms (like Kickstarter) which first inspired securities
crowdfunding.
228. In Minnesota, however, a portal operator does have different
registration requirements as broker-dealers. Compare MINN. STAT. § 80A.461,
subdiv. 7 (MNvest portal operator requirements), with MINN. STAT. § 80A.61
(Registration by Broker-Dealer . . .).
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pursuant to a state law exemption like MNvest.229 Because
avoiding potentially prohibitive registration costs is one of the
main goals of crowdfunding issuers, it would appear that the
second of the two optionswhich in Minnesota implies the use
of a portal230is preferable.
MNvest provides several requirements for portal operators
regarding recordkeeping231 and verification of investor
residency.232 Regulation Crowdfunding also requires similar
actions by portal operators.233 To the extent that this kind of
information would necessarily be collected by the portal
operator as part of any sale of crowdfunded securities, these
identity verification and additional storage requirements do not
seem particularly onerous, and certainly not very useful for
distinguishing the two models.234
In Minnesota, at least, portal operators are supposed to be
extremely neutral in their intermediary activities. They are not
allowed to provide investment advice.235 While the restriction
on investment advice means that investors may have to visit
another vendors site before purchasing, investors and issuers
are thereby protected from unscrupulous portal operators who
might otherwise favor one campaign over another.236
MNvest portal operators are further restricted in the
calculation of the fees they charge to issuers, specifically in
that they cannot charge a fee based on the amount of securities
229. See Rule 147 Proposal, 80 Fed. Reg. at 69,83132 (proposed §
230.147(a)(1) & (2)).
230. MINN. STAT. § 80A.461, subdiv. 3(3).
231. See MINN. STAT. § 80A.461, subdiv. 7(e) (mandating a MNvest portal
operator keeps certain information about all potential investors, the offering,
and certain people connected with the issuer).
232. See MINN. STAT. § 80A.461, subdiv. 6 (prescribing the content for a
residency declaration that must be provided before an investor can access the
offers section of a MNvest portal).
233. See generally Regulation Crowdfunding Final Rules Release, 80 Fed.
Reg. at 71,54245 (final rules §§ 227.300.305).
234. See generally id. at 71,443.
235. See MINN. STAT. § 80A.461, subdiv. 7(c)(1) (prohibition on offering
investment advice or recommendations).
236. See Regulation Crowdfunding Final Rules Release, 80 Fed. Reg. at
71,430, n.613 (noting certain industry group concerns that financially-
interested intermediaries would be otherwise incentivized to promote certain
projects over others).
382 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 18:1
offered for sale through their site.237 This is in slight contrast to
the federal Regulation Crowdfunding rules which do not place
a restriction for fees-calculation based on amount of securities
sold.238 A portal operator might therefore prefer, and an issuer
might thus have more luck convincing the portal operator, to
run an offering under Regulation Crowdfunding instead of
MNvest. Finally, even though the MNvest prohibition on fees
based on amount of the offering will initially cause some
confusion as to the appropriate market price for portal
operators services, this is nothing that market forces cannot
solve quickly via trial and error.
It is likely that some portals will only operate in local or
regional markets, while others will choose to operate
exclusively on a national scale.239 To the extent that cost
differences arising between nationally-operating portals and
more targeted regional or topic-specific portals are driven by
market differences rather than by the different needs of federal
or state crowdfunding models, companies seeking crowdfunding
support may not have much meaningful guidance when
choosing between models. All other factors being equal, a portal
which can be used to reach a national audience will by default
have more options to recoup startup capital (i.e., more potential
securities issuer clients) than a portal tailored specifically to
one states intrastate model.
4. Other Important Considerations
Certain other requirements common to both of the state
and federal crowdfunding models may impact whether
securities crowdfunding is the most desirable route at all for
companies. Under Regulation Crowdfunding, an issuer must
have a business plan.240 Although not stated explicitly in the
237. See MINN. STAT. § 80A.461, subdiv. 7(c)(3) (fees can be either based on
length of listing time on portal, or a flat fee, or some combination of the two).
238. See Regulation Crowdfunding Final Rules Release, 80 Fed. Reg. at
71,539 (final rule § 227.501(o)).
239. Indeed, such regional and topic specialization has become the norm in
the rewards- and donation-based model portals. Compare KICKSTARTER,
www.kickstarter.com (last visited Oct. 11, 2016) (national), with POWER2GIVE,
power2give.org (last visited Oct. 11, 2016) (Broward County, FL), and REALTY
MOGUL, www.realtymogul.com (last visited Oct. 11, 2016) (real estate
investing).
240. See Regulation Crowdfunding Final Rules Release, 80 Fed. Reg. at
71,53738 (particularly § 227.100); see also id. at 71,398 (The final rules also
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statutory or regulatory language, MNvest also appears to
assume that only companies able to provide a business plan to
investors will be able to meet the MNvest issuer disclosure
requirements.241 This requirement may come as an unwelcome
obstacle for those familiar with the more laissez-faire project
descriptions and updates which accompany many rewards-
based crowdfunding campaigns.242 Furthermore, it is clear that
companies with very innovative products or business models
may be extremely uncomfortable disclosing potential trade
secret information with investors, even assuming the use of
confidentiality agreements.243 Assuming that a company is
committed to raising funds through crowdfunding, however,
they will be stuck with at least some kind of disclosure
requirement.
As a final positive aspect, both the Section 3(a)(11) model
under Rule 147 as proposed and the Regulation Crowdfunding
model are nonexclusive methods of exempt fundraising.244 This
means that even if an issuer reached the limit under one model
during a twelve-month period it could supplement with an
offering under another exemption.245 Issuers using either
exclude an issuer that has no specific business plan or has indicated that its
business plan is to engage in a merger or acquisition with an unidentified
company or companies.).
241. See MINN. STAT. § 80A.461, subdiv. 5(1) (2015) (requiring disclosure of
the material facts of its business plan and its capital structure). It is also
common sense to note that investors are unlikely to entrust an untested
company with substantial sums of money without first proving the concept in
a business plan.
242. See, e.g., Kevin & Robin Brown, Soft Animal/Hideous Heart in Fringe,
GOFUNDME, https://www.gofundme.com/r893tu9g (last visited Oct. 11, 2016)
(showing only some pictures and a brief description of the project, without any
of the financial information that would be required under securities
crowdfunding regulation).
243. See Damico, supra note 177 (For an emerging company, that
information is going to be publicly available, so that potentially could put
them at some disadvantage with competitors being able to know their
business plan.).
244. See Regulation Crowdfunding Final Rules Release, 80 Fed. Reg. at
71,391 (Capital raised through other means would not be counted in
determining the aggregate amount sold in reliance on Section 4(a)(6).); see
also Rule 147 Proposal, 80 Fed. Reg. at 69,795 (As proposed, offers and sales
made pursuant to Rule 147 would not be integrated with . . . [s]ubsequent
offers or sales of securities that are . . . [e]xempt from registration under
section 4(a)(6) of the [Securities] Act.).
245. See sources cited supra note 244 (identifying other exemptions
available; under Regulation A, etc.).
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equity crowdfunding model should be relieved to hear that the
capital gap can be filled in many ways simultaneously.
III. CONCLUSION
The major differences, and there are only a few of great
relevance, between the federal Regulation Crowdfunding model
and Minnesota model state laws revolve around the investment
limits for individual investors and the ability of issuers to reach
groups of potential investors out of state. The state-based
model may have a slight cost-savings edge when it comes to the
costs of ongoing reporting, though it will be difficult to make
firm conclusions until businesses start wading through the
complex regulatory web. For truly local businesses with a
dedicated following and modest capital needs, the state-model
may offer a sensible alternative to traditional securities
exemptions. This becomes doubly true when the potential
investors have high enough net-worth and income to clear the
$100,000 mark but are not quite accredited under the
regulatory parameters.
On the other hand, the allowance of sales across state lines
will likely make the federal model more attractive to companies
with larger capital needs, or that do not have the targeted
name recognition of other crowdfunders. The federal model
may also attract more players in the intermediary role, as the
restrictions on how intermediary fees are calculated appear
less onerous under Regulation Crowdfunding than the
Minnesota model. Finally, when push comes to shove, an issuer
completing a crowdfunding campaign under either model will
always have other exempt offering options available to them. It
may indeed be the competition with options like private
placements and Rule 504 (assuming increased offering limits)
that ultimately dictates the success of Regulation
Crowdfunding.
Much of how the securities crowdfunding situation shakes
out will turn on how the SEC decides to deal with Rule 147.
Should the SEC decide to keep the rule as a safe harbor instead
of making a new exemption, a serious statutory issue may need
to be fixed before state models can comfortably use the internet
to advertise. Until this tension is resolved, however,
crowdfunding participantsparticularly those interested in
Minnesota model statutesare caught between a rock and a
hard place. Hopefully, participants in the crowdfunding market
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will not have to wait another 1000 days to figure out how these
models will work in practice.
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Appendix: Issuer Disclosure Documents








with other required disclosures
Required
Issuer Demographics & Current Business Description
Identity of Issuer Name, Address, Legal status
(entity type, etc.), Website
Type of entity, the address












Names of holders of 20%+
voting equity interests
Names of holders of 10%+
voting equity interests
Business of the Issuer Description of current business,
future business plans
Formation history for the
previous five years;
summary of the material
facts of its business plan










Date, type of exemption, type





capital resources and historical
results of operations
(Not explicitly mentioned)
246. Adapted from 17 C.F.R. § 227.201 (2016) (Subpart B  Requirements
for Issuers; Disclosure Requirements).
247. Adapted from MINN. STAT. § 80A.461, subdiv. 4 (2015) (Required
disclosures to prospective MNvest offering purchasers).
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Financial Statements Taxable income $0-$100,000:
certified by CEO; Taxable
income $100,001-$500,000:
reviewed by accountant;
Taxable income > $500,000:
audited by accountant
If offering less than
$1,000,000, no audit or
review requirement; larger
offering, up to $2,000,000,
requires audit or review by
certified professionals under
Minn. Stat. Ch. 326A
Capital Structure Description of all securities
currently outstanding, including
voting rights/limits, valuation,
risks of additional securities
offerings
Summary of the material
facts of its capital structure
Material Terms & Risks of the Crowdfunding Offering







issuance may result in
dilution; statement of the
material risks unique to the






issuer will accept investments
in excess of target; including
how to cancel, if desired
Date of expiration (not more










including any amounts paid
or payable to an owner,
executive officer, director,
governor, manager, member




Instructions on how to
reconfirm investment interest,
and consequences if not
reconfirmed
Description of possible exit
strategies
Terms of the Offering Price; valuation methodology terms and conditions of
the offering
Other Statutory & General Securities Law Requirements
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Resale Restrictions Required notice to purchasers Statement that the
securities have not been
registered under federal or
state securities law and that





Name, SEC number, CRD
number, any transaction-
dependent financial interests of
the intermediary
Disclosure must include a






Description of any transactions
with director, officer, 20%+
voting equity holder, or family








Identification of matters which
would have DQed certain
executives, if after May 16,
2016; exercise of reasonable





involving the MNvest issuer

















History of compliance or failure
to comply with reporting
requirements
(Not explicitly mentioned)
